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AN OUTRAGEOUS RESPONSE TO "YOU'RE FIRED!"*
WILLIAM R. CORBETT**

"[W]hile the loss of a job is often devastating to an employee
and at times unfair, these considerations do not play a role under
our employment-at-will doctrine, and our exceptions to this law,
such as sex discrimination, are only based on the underlying
discriminatorymotivation of the decision maker.'"
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INTRODUCTION

"You're fired!" Donald Trump popularized this terse and jarring
declaration on the television show The Apprentice. The catch phrase
became the signature line of the television show and spawned "You're
Fired" merchandise 2 and copycats, but Trump was not the only person
to become associated with the evocative declaration.' As sadistically
entertaining as the statement may seem when used by television
characters, when real people are fired from real jobs, the sentence
seems far less entertaining. When people are fired, many file lawsuits,
and in the United States many lose those lawsuits because of our
unique employment-at-will doctrine, which provides that, absent
variation from the default rule, an employer can discharge employees
without a job-related reason without incurring liability.' In some cases,
people are fired from their jobs for reasons that seem unrelated to job
performances and sometimes seem quite unfair.6 To many, the
2. See, e.g., Stephen M. Silverman, "You're Fired!" T-Shirts Hit Racks, PEOPLE (Mar. 17,
2004), http://www.people.com/people/article/,,627999,00.html. Mr. Trump even sought
to trademark the phrase. See Martin Wolk, "You're fired!" Could Become Trump Trademark,
NBCNEWS.COM
(Mar.
30,
2004),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4557459
/ns/business-us-business/t/youre-fired-could-becometrump -trademark/. His effort failed.
See Eric Dash, "Fired"Topped by "Hired"At the Trademark Office, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/30/business/fired-topped-by-hired-at-the-trademarkoffice.html.
3. The British version of the show, a spin-off of the United States version with Trump,
also
used
"You're
fired."
See
The Apprentice: You're
Fired, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The Apprentice: You%27reFired! (last visited Sept. 22,
2013). In the United States, the chairman and CEO of World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc.,
Vince McMahon, had his on-air television persona scream in a raspy voice, "You're fired!" at
numerous employees of the organization, usually wrestlers, in on-air skits. See You're Fired!,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/You%27re-fired! (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). In
one such skit, McMahon spewed the declaration at Donald Trump, who was a guest
character on several WWE shows. See WWE Raw-Vince McMahon Says "You're Fired" to
Donald
Trump,
YouTUBE
(Mar.
22,
2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GPXcuSLm5NO. Other characters have been known for
their use of the catch phrase, including Mr. Cosmo Spacely, CEO of Spacely Sprockets on the
1960s and 1980s television cartoon series TheJetsons. See You're Fired!,supra.
4. See infra PartI.
5. For laws and jurisdictions that require it for termination, the definition of good or
just cause invariably includes unsatisfactory job performance, failure to comply with work
rules or policies, and economic reasons unrelated to the employee's work performance. See,
e.g., Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2903(5) (2011) ("'Good cause' means reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on
a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or
other legitimate business reason."). Although the Montana statute does not expressly state
that economic circumstances of the employer may constitute "good cause," the case law has
recognized that economic reasons fit within the statutory language: "other legitimate
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combination of an unfair termination from a job and a legal regime that
denies redress seems downright outrageous!
A particularly troubling and seemingly common set of
terminations involves women being fired for reasons related to their
appearance or other reasons related to their sex. Although there are
differences and nuances among the cases, at the simplest, they involve
women being fired from jobs because they are, in the view of their
superiors, either not sufficiently attractive or too attractive. Although it
may seem that under such facts women could successfully sue for sex
(or other) discrimination, this often is not the case.
One of the latest cause c6l6bre termination cases to provoke a
collective sense of outrage is the case of Melissa Nelson, a dental
assistant who was fired by her employer, dentist James Knight.' Dr.
Knight realized that he found Ms. Nelson "irresistible" and feared he
might try to have an extramarital affair with her.' As a result, and after
his wife demanded it, he fired Ms. Nelson.9 Ms. Nelson, like most people
who lose their jobs, thought she had been wrongfully terminated, and
she sued. Unfortunately, Ms. Nelson was not in Heaven, or even
Montana,"o but Iowa," which is one of the forty-nine employment-atwill states. So, under what theory could she sue Dr. Knight? Like so
many other wrongfully terminated employees, she turned to the
employment discrimination statutes and sued for sex discrimination.
In a story that has been replayed almost innumerable times, a
"wrongfully discharged" employee sued her former employer for

business reason." Cecil v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 797 P.2d 232, 234 (Mont. 1990). France
classifies good cause as "personal reasons" and "economic reasons." See MICHEL DESPAX,
JACQUES ROJOT, & JEAN-PIERRE LABORDE, LABOUR LAW IN FRANCE 153, 156-58 (2011). To similar
effect is the convention of the International Labour Organization on termination of
employment: "The employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid
reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based
on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service." Termination
of Employment Convention art. 4, June 22, 1982, 1412 U.N.T.S. 23645.
6. See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, That's Not Discrimination:American Beliefs and the Limits of
Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1347 (2012) (observing that "most
employees have expansive beliefs about non-just-cause terminations, believing that a wide
array of factually unjustified firings are unfair and unlawful, despite the fact that at-will
employment remains the norm in most states").
7. See Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 2013).
8. See Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., No. 11-1857, 2012 WL 6652747 (Iowa Dec.
21, 2012), withdrawn and superseded by Nelson, 834 N.W.2d 64.
9. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66.
10. Montana is the lone state that does not have employment-at-will as its default rule,
having enacted the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987. MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (2011).
11. "Is This Heaven?" "No, it's Iowa." FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Studios 1989).

CITEAS 92 N.C. L. REV.ADDENDUM20

20

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

employment discrimination and lost.12 The employer moved for
summary judgment in the district court and won. On appeal, the Iowa
Supreme Court affirmed."
Whether or not one agrees with the Iowa Supreme Court's
decision in Nelson,' 4 the case illustrates the fact that employment
discrimination laws do not provide redress for many unfair
terminations. In the land of employment at will, what can provide a
remedy for unfair discharges that a substantial segment of society
considers outrageous, particularly terminations of women related to
their appearance or other aspects of sex? This Article argues that
outrage is the answer, but not just outrage expressed in op-eds, blogs,
and news segments. The legal system has a tort designed for providing
relief when the harmful conduct at issue outrages society. It is the tort
of outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED").
Three major themes from employment law scholarship inform
this Article. First, recent scholarship has examined the migration of
principles and doctrines between employment discrimination law and
tort law.'s Second, many commentators have explored the relative
difficulty of recovery on employment discrimination claims compared
with other types of claims.' 6 Finally, it has long been noted that
employment discrimination law inherently conflicts with employment
at will, and the powerful employment-at-will doctrine is more
influential-dictating the result in fringe cases that do not fit squarely
within the protection of employment discrimination laws." In light of
these three considerations, employment discrimination law need not
be stretched to cover termination cases that are tinged with
appearance-based or other sex-related discrimination. Instead,
employment discrimination law should yield to, but also inform, tort
law. The tort of IIED, although not currently filling this role effectively,
could do so if infused with some tenets of employment discrimination
law. Then, the amorphous concept of outrageous conduct would begin
12. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 73.
13. Id.
14. For discussion and analysis of the Nelson decision, see infra Part II.A.
15. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretextfor Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal to
Let Employment DiscriminationSpeakfor Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 447-48 (2 013); Sandra
F. Sperino, DiscriminationStatutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 1-2; Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination,92 B.U. L. REV. 1431,
1431-32 (2012).
16. See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 6, at 1282 n.27 (discussing the relative lack of success and
collecting other sources).
17. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, The "Fall"of Summers, The Rise of "PretextPlus," and the
EscalatingSubordination of Federal Employment DiscriminationLaw to Employment at Will:
Lessonsfrom McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305, 305-11 (1996).
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to take shape, and society could express its outrage at terminations
like that of Melissa Nelson by providing a legal remedy. IIED could
become a tort well-suited to patrolling the fringes of employment
discrimination law and providing redress for outrageous terminations.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of employment at will
and the very limited exceptions to the doctrine, including employment
discrimination laws. Part II discusses the Nelson case, as well as other
cases in which fired female employees claimed that appearance or
some aspect of sex played a significant role in their terminations.
These cases range from employees fired for being irresistible, or
resistible, to sexual favoritism cases. Part III discusses the role of tort
law in employment terminations, considering the track record of the
two tort theories that most often have been asserted in termination
cases-wrongful discharge in violation of public policy ("WDVPP") and
IIED. This part discusses why WDVPP has provided a remedy in only a
small set of termination cases, not including most appearance- and sexbased discharges. Part III also considers why IIED generally has not
been a successful theory of recovery for employment terminations.
Part IV considers developments in the law of IIED which suggest that
the tort of outrage infused with employment discrimination tenets
could yield a tort that would provide an effective remedy in
appearance- and sex-tinged terminations like that in Nelson. Finally,
Part IV explains why tort law is better suited than employment
discrimination law to examine such cases, how tort law may provide
redress for these terminations, and why a reconceptualized IIED is the
appropriate tort to accomplish these goals.
I. "YOU'RE

A.

FIRED!" IN THE LAND OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

Employment at Will and Its Exceptions

Among all the nations of the world with developed labor law
regimes, only the United States generally permits employers to fire
employees without a job-related reason and without notice.'" Under
employment at will, employers can fire employees for a good or bad

18. Most nations' employment termination laws require a job-related reason, either
personal or economic, for termination. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch,
Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law: Reassessing American Exceptionalism 92 N.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=2238776. Canadian termination law is perhaps closest to that of the United
States, permitting termination without cause as long as the employer provides notice. See id.
(manuscript at 5); Rachel Arnow-Richman, just Notice: Re-Forming Employment at Will, 58
UCLA L.REV. 1,49 (2010).
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reason1 unless the at-will relationship has been modified under
statutory or common law.20 Consequently, fired employees in almost
all states, with the lone exception of Montana, 2 1 who think they have
been wrongfully terminated cannot obtain redress in the way that
employees in other nations can-by suing their employers and
demanding that the employer prove good cause for terminating them.2 2
Instead, in order to recover they must show that their employers, by
firing them, breached an employment contract, violated a statute, or
committed a tort.2 3
These three exceptions to employment at will are, however,
unavailing for most employees. First, most fired employees do not have
a viable claim based on breach of an employment contract because few
employers contractually modify the at-will relationship.24 Second,
statutory modifications of employment at will often cover only
particular types of wrongful discharge claims. For example, a number
of statutes at the federal, 25 state, 26 and local 27 levels supplement
19. See, e.g., Payne v. W. & Ati. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) ("All may dismiss
their employe[e]s at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for cause
morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong."), overruled on other grounds,
Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful
DischargeProtectionsin an At-Will World, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1655, 1657-58 (1996) (discussing
employers' "right to fire employees at will-for good reason, for bad reason, or for no
reason at all").
20. Courts have recognized that employers and employees can modify the at-will
presumption by contract. See, e.g., Place v. Conn. Coll., No. CV106003543, 2013 WL
3388744, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 11, 2013); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.03 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009). Furthermore, as will be developed
below, courts have recognized tort theories that are applicable to some terminations.
21. See supra note 10.
22. The law of France is an example. See supra note 5. The Employment Rights Act of
the United Kingdom classifies dismissals as fair and unfair and requires a reason that
relates to the capability and qualifications of the employee for performing work, the
conduct of the employee, the redundancy of the employee, the continued employment
violating another enactment, or other substantial reason. Employment Rights Act, 1996, c.
18, § 98 (U.K.), availableat http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/section/98.
23. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Beyond the Water Cooler: Speech and the Workplace in the
Era of Social Media, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 75, 83-87 (2012) (discussing common law
and statutory exceptions to employment-at-will).
24. See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment
Contracts: Resolving the just Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 837, 867 (noting that, in a
survey of employers in five states, about fifty-two percent of employers explicitly
contracted for employment at will, about one-third used documents that did not address
discharge, and only about fifteen percent contracted for just-cause protection).
25. In addition to the federal employment discrimination statutes, see infra notes 2931, there are numerous anti-retaliation provisions in federal law that prohibit termination
for an employee's asserting rights under, for example, the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2011), or the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2011).
There are other types of federal statutes that prohibit discharges or other adverse
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employment at will, the most significant of which are employment
discrimination statutes.2 8 These employment discrimination laws
prohibit employers from firing or taking other adverse employment
actions based on specified characteristics of employees, such as race,
color, sex, religion, national origin, 29 age 30 or disability.3 ' Although
many fired employees attempt to fit their termination lawsuits under
these laws, many do not fit unless the employment discrimination
theories are stretched to some extent. 32 Finally, while plaintiffs have
sued using the tort theories of wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, few have
prevailed on these claims. 33
Employment at will is unlikely to be abandoned by another state
in the foreseeable future. Although legislatures, law reform
commissions, 34 and academics 3 s have made numerous proposals for
employment actions, such as the whistleblower provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which
prohibits taking adverse actions against employees who provide information regarding
securities law violations by the employer. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
26. Most states have employment discrimination laws that more or less track the
federal laws. See, e.g., Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 23:301-369 (2010). In addition to discrimination laws, various states have a variety of
other statutes prohibiting firing employees for a variety of reasons. Most states prohibit
retaliation for asserting rights under workers' compensation laws. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. 23:1361 (2011). A few states have laws prohibiting firing or other adverse
employment actions based on an employee's engaging in lawful off-duty activities. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2012).
27. Some local governments have employment discrimination laws. See, e.g., SANTA
CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 9.83.010, 9.83.020, & 9.83.030 (2013), available at
http://www.codepublishing.com/CA/SantaCruz/.
28. See Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, How the New Economics Can Improve
Employment DiscriminationLaw, and How Economics Can Survive the Demise of the "Rational
Actor," 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 183, 190 (2009) (stating that employment discrimination "is
both the main field of employment regulation and the source of doctrine for other areas of
employment law").
29. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination "because of' color,
race, sex, religion, or national origin. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-15 (2011).
30. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2011).
31. See Americans with Disabilities Act of1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2011).
32. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil
Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2177 (2007) (stating that "litigators often
attempt to shoehorn their claims into one of the protected categories").
33. See infra Part III.
34. Consider the Model Employment Termination Act, promulgated by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1991. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATION

ACT

(1991),

available

at

http://www.uniformlaws

.org/shared/docs/Employment%2OTermination/META final_91.pdf. It has not been
enacted by a single state. See Model Employment Termination Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Employment Termination Act, Model (last visited
Sept. 24, 2013) (indicating through legislative tracking that no enactments have been made
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replacing employment at will with some other termination principle,
predictions of the imminent demise of employment at will have proven
wrong.3 6 Fired employees turn to employment discrimination statutes
because they rarely have other options; however, employment
discrimination statutes were not intended to, and should not, provide a
remedy for unfair terminations unless the reason is a characteristic
protected by those statutes.
B.

Employment DiscriminationLaws as a Narrow Limitation on
Employment at Will

Employment discrimination laws at all levels prohibit employers
from taking adverse employment actions against an employee
"because of" some specified characteristic, such as race, sex, or age. For
example, Title VII states that it is an unlawful employment practice "to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, sex, or national origin."38 Thus, discharge is
only one type of adverse employment action prohibited by
employment discrimination laws. In the early years after the
enactment of Title VII, most claims were based on refusal to hire, but
over the years the majority of claims have become discharge claims. 39
As a result, this shift from claims based on refusal to hire to claims
based on terminations has brought employment discrimination laws
increasingly into tension with employment at will.

at this time). The 1987 Montana Wrongful Discharge Act preceded the 1991 Model Act. See
J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A Modest Proposal to DeMarginalizeEmployment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347, 371, 376 (1995).
35. The proposals in the academic literature are legion. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra
note 18, at 7; Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More With Less, 68 MD. L. REV.
89, 89-95 (2008); Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between AtWill Employment andjustCause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 62-66 (2008).
36. Consider for example, the following prediction from the year 2000: "The future of
employment-at-will, then, is that it has no future." Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will:
The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 653, 687 (2000); see also Cornelius J.
Peck, Unjust DischargesFrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1,
1-2 (1979) (predicting the demise of employment-at-will).
37. The special concurrence in Nelson reiterated several times that employment-at-will
required that plaintiff lose because she had not proven sex discrimination. See Nelson v.
James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 75 (Iowa 2013) (Cady, C.J., concurring specially).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2011) (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
DiscriminationLitigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991) (noting that "[h]iring charges
outnumbered termination charges by 50 percent in 1966, but by 1985, the ratio had
reversed by more than 6 to 1").
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Recognizing the tension between employment at will and
employment discrimination law, the United States Supreme Court in
several decisions has explained that although employment
discrimination laws impinge upon employer prerogative to some
extent, they do not empower courts to restructure employers' business
practices or second-guess most employer decisions.4 0 The courts have
limited the incursion of employment discrimination laws on
employment at will by focusing on the "because of"4 ' requirement. A
termination does not violate employment discrimination laws unless
there is a causal connection between the termination and the protected
characteristic. For sex discrimination, Title VII also has a lower
"motivating factor" causation standard,4 2 which was added by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.43 Consequently, a termination does not violate
discrimination laws unless the discharge is caused by the sex of the
plaintiff. As will be developed in discussion of the cases below,4 4 the
causal connection can be elusive in many cases in which the
termination seems related to the plaintiffs appearance or sex. If the
causal connection is not established, then employment at will prevails.
II. FIRING "IRRESISTIBLE" PEOPLE AND OTHER TERMINATION LAWSUITS

INVOLVING APPEARANCE OR SEX
Numerous cases exist in which women were fired and their
termination seemed to be related to their appearance or some other
aspect of sex, such as a sexual attraction. In these cases, the plaintiffs
usually sue for sex discrimination and lose because courts do not find
the requisite causal connection between the plaintiffs sex and the
firing.
A.

The Latest Outrage:Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C.

Melissa Nelson worked as a dental assistant for Dr. James Knight
for over ten years before she was fired in January 2010,45 and Dr.
40. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989); Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
41. The Supreme Court has interpreted the "because of' language in other employment
discrimination provisions to mean but-for causation. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (interpreting the language under the anti-retaliation
provision in Title VII); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (interpreting
the "because of'language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2011).
43. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-2(m) (2011)).
44. See infra Part II for discussion of the Nelson case and others.
45. See Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 2013).
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Knight acknowledged that she was a good dental assistant.46 Both
Nelson and Knight were married and had children.4 Knight was about
twenty years older than Nelson.48 During the last year of her
employment, Knight began treating Nelson differently, commenting on
her clothes being too tight, and suggesting that her physical
appearance was arousing him.4 9 Although Nelson said she regarded
Knight as a "friend" and a "father figure," she alleged that he made
some sexually suggestive comments to her in person and by text
message.so She asserted that she did not respond to those comments.5"
The situation escalated when Dr. Knight took his children on a
Christmas vacation without his wife, and Nelson and Knight texted
each other throughout that time.5 2 Because of this, Mrs. Knight
confronted Dr. Knight and insisted that he fire Nelson.s3 The Knights
consulted the senior pastor of their church, who agreed that Nelson
should be fired.5 4 Dr. Knight then called Nelson into his office and,
accompanied by another pastor from his church, he read from a
prepared statement, telling her that their relationship had become
detrimental to his family and stating that it was in their best interests
to discontinue working together. 5 Dr. Knight eventually met with
Nelson's husband after he called Knight. In that meeting, again
attended by a minister from Knight's church, Knight explained to
Nelson's husband that she had done nothing wrong or inappropriate,
but Knight feared that he would try to have an affair with her if she
continued to work for him.5 6
When he terminated Nelson, Dr. Knight gave her one month's
severance pay. 7 Nelson cried and said she loved her job-to no avail. 8
"You're fired!" Entertaining?

46. Id. at 65.
47. Id. at 66.
48. Joe Kemp, Iowa Court OKs Firing of Female Dental Assistant for Being Too
"Irresistibly Attractive," N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 22, 2012), http://www.nydailynews
.com/news/national/iowa-court-oks -firing-female-worker-irresistibly-attractive -article1.1226068#ixzz2d7iSMm3q.
49. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 66.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Melissa Nelson filed a charge with the Iowa Civil Rights
Commission, alleging sex discrimination in violation of state
employment discrimination law.'9 After receiving a right-to-sue letter,
she filed a lawsuit in state court, asserting a sex discrimination claim.60
She did not include IIED as a theory of recovery,6 1 but as will be
discussed below, the tort theory probably would have been unavailing
anyway.6 2 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Knight.6 3 Nelson appealed the district court's decision to the Iowa
Supreme Court.
The Iowa Supreme Court framed the issue as follows: "Can a male
employer terminate a long-time female employee because the
employer's wife, due to no fault of the employee, is concerned about
the relationship between the employer and the employee?"64 The court
understood that its task, based on the state employment
discrimination law, was to determine whether the employer fired
Nelson "because of' sex, which, borrowing from federal discrimination
law, means that sex was a motivating factor in the employer's
decision.6 5
The Iowa Supreme Court looked to case law under Title VII for
guidance.6 6 The court first considered Tenge v. PhillipsModern Ag Co.,6 7
in which a business owner fired a female employee at his wife's

59. Id. at 67.
60. See Petition and Jury Demand at 1, Nelson v. James H. Knight, DDS, P.C., No.
LACV315104 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 12, 2012).
61. See id.
62. Iowa law on IIED in the employment context is consistent with the law of most
other states. It is hard to recover for IIED in employment, and terminations particularly are
not considered outrageous because of employment-at-will. See Butts v. Univ. of Osteopathic
Med. & Health Scis., 561 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Iowa 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Teachout v. Forest City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 584 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 1998); Cheek v. ABC
Beverage Mfrs., Inc., No. 6-630, 2006 WL 2560890, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006) (unpublished
table decision). For discussion of courts' reluctance to permit recovery for IIED based on
terminations, see infra Parts III.B-C and accompanying text.
63. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67.
64. Id. at 65.
6 5. Id. at 6 7.
66. Most states look to federal employment discrimination case law as a guide to
interpreting their state employment discrimination laws because the dispositive terms of
the state statutes often replicate the language of the federal statutes. See Alex B. Long, "If the
Train Should Jump the Track...": Divergent Interpretations of State and Federal Employment
DiscriminationStatutes, 40 GA. L. REv. 469, 477 (2006) (explaining that "[s]everal factors
help explain the general rule of this lockstep approach to the interpretation of parallel state
and federal employment discrimination statutes").
67. 446 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006).
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insistence.68 In Tenge, the Eighth Circuit first looked to cases in which
sexual favoritism in employment did not amount to illegal sex
discrimination, but rather discrimination based on sexual conduct,
which is not covered by Title VII. The Eighth Circuit considered the
sexual favoritism cases roughly analogous to the case before it,
reasoning that if treating an employee favorably due to sexual conduct
does not constitute prohibited sex discrimination, neither does
treating an employee unfavorably.6 9 However, realizing that the case
before it was distinguishable because the plaintiff was fired, the Tenge
court next considered Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors,Inc.,70 in
which an employee was treated less favorably (she was fired) for being
perceived as a threat to the marriage of the owner's son. Finally, the
Tenge court considered three cases supporting the proposition that
firing an employee for engaging in consensual sexual conduct with no
allegations of sexual harassment does not violate Title VII." Based on
all of the precedent it reviewed, the Eighth Circuit concluded in Tenge
that the employee's termination did not violate Title VII; the plaintiff
was fired not "because of" her sex but because of the owner's desire to
assuage his wife's concern over the plaintiffs admitted conduct with

him.7 2
Nelson argued that Tenge was not analogous to her case because,
unlike the plaintiff in Tenge, Nelson did nothing to get herself fired
other than "exist as a female."" Thus, the court posed the issue as
whether an employee who has not engaged in flirtatious conduct can
be legally fired because the boss views her as "an irresistible
attraction."7 4 The court observed that it was unusual to ask that
68. The Iowa court noted that, unlike the case before it, Tenge involved a fired female
employee who admitted that she had written and left accessible notes of a sexual or
intimate nature that could have led the owner's wife to believe that she and the owner were
having an affair. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 68.
69. Tenge,446F.3dat909-10.
70. 908 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1990).
71. Tenge, 446 F.3d at 909 (citing Kahn v. Objective Solutions, Int'l, 86 F. Supp. 2d 377,
382 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Campbell v. Masten, 955 F. Supp. 526, 529 (D. Md. 1997); Freeman v.
Cont'l Technical Servs., Inc., 710 F. Supp. 328, 331 (N.D. Ga. 1988)).
72. Id. at910.
73. Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 69 (Iowa 2013).
74. See Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., No. 11-1857, 2012 WL 6652747, at *5 (Iowa
Dec. 21, 2012), withdrawn and superseded by Nelson, 834 N.W.2d 64. The "irresistible
attraction" language does not appear in the opinion on rehearing. As will be discussed
below, after issuing the original opinion in December 2012, the court granted rehearing,
withdrew its original opinion, and issued a new and superseding opinion in July 2013.
There were few changes in the principal opinion between the December 2012 version,
which was withdrawn, and the July 2013 opinion. However, one change is that the phrase
"irresistible attraction" does not appear in the new opinion; instead, it is replaced by
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question in a case of employment discrimination, in which the usual
focus is on the employer's motivation, not "whether the discharge in a
broader sense is fair."75
Plaintiff Nelson raised three arguments that the court considered.
First, she argued that, contrary to Tenge, any termination based on a
superior's sexual attraction to a subordinate employee is by its very
nature discrimination "because of" sex. 7 6 The Iowa court rejected that
argument, explaining that such decisions are based on feelings
regarding a particular individual, rather than feelings toward a
gender.n Moreover, the court felt if Nelson's argument were accepted,
any termination related to a consensual relationship would be
"because of" sex.78
Second, Nelson argued that holding that sexual attraction
discrimination does not constitute sex discrimination enforces genderbased stereotypes and permits pretexts for sex discrimination.79 The
court recognized gender stereotyping as a viable theory of sex
discrimination, but explained that Nelson was not fired for
nonconformance with any particular stereotype.o
Third, Nelson argued that if her employer could be held liable for
sexual harassment, he should not be able to avoid such liability by
firing her out of fear that he was going to harass her.8 ' The court
responded to this argument by explaining that a single decision to
terminate does not constitute harassment.82
The court rejected Nelson's arguments, holding that the issue
before it was not whether Knight treated Nelson badly, but whether he
discriminated based on sex when he fired her at his wife's request.8 3

"because the boss's spouse views the relationship between the boss and the employee as a
threat to her marriage." Nelson, 2012 WL 6652747, at *5. It would not be inplausible to
speculate that the change had something to do with the fact that the media seized upon the
catch phrase "irresistible attraction." See, e.g., Iowa Court Rules Boss can Fire Employee He
Considers an
"Irresistible Attraction,"
Fox
NEWS.COM
(Dec.
22,
2012)
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/12/22/iowa-court-rules-boss-can-fire-employeeconsiders-irresistible -attraction/.
75. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 69. The original opinion stated it as follows: "whether the
discharge in a broader sense is fair because the employee did something to 'deserve it.' "See
Nelson, 2012 WL 6652747, at *5.
76. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 70.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 71.
81. Id. at 70.
82. Id. at 72.
83. Id. at 7 3.
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Based on this framing of the issue, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled
against Nelson.84
The Nelson case captured the public's attention, as it went viral on
the internet,8 5 generated op-eds, 86 and provoked television
interviews.8 ' The general public thought that Dr. Knight should not
have been able to terminate Ms. Nelson without incurring some legal
liability. Despite this widespread public outrage," the Iowa Supreme
Court denied recovery under the theory of sex discrimination-not
once, but twice.
The Iowa Supreme Court's treatment of the case is bizarre. The
court rendered its initial decision against Nelson in December 2012.90
After the firestorm of publicity, much of it criticizing the court's
decision,9 the court withdrew its original opinion, reheard the case
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Associated Press, US judge Supports Dentist for Sacking "Irresistible"
Assistant, NEWS.COM.AU (Dec. 24, 2012, 12:35 PM), http://www.news.com.au/worldnews/us-judges-supports-dentist-for-sacking-irresistible-assistant/story-fndir2ev1226542971435#ixzz2VStGHg00; DentalAssistant Who Was Firedfor Being "Too Attractive"
Takes Appeal to Supreme Court, DAILY MAIL (Jan.
6, 2013,
5:46 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2257985/Irresistible-lowa-mom-pleads-malestate -supreme -court-void -ruling-randy-dentist- sacked -save -marriage.html.
86. See, e.g., Simply Irresistible:Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS (Iowa 2012), IOWA L. &
POL. (Dec. 20, 2012), http://iowalawandpolitics.com/2012/12/30/simply-irresistiblenelson-v-james-h-knight-dds-iowa-2012/; Gerald D. Skoning, Op-Ed., Voice of the People:
Unfair
Firing,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Jan.
6,
2013),
http://articles.chicagotribune
.com/2013-01-06/opinion/ct-vp-0106voicelettersbriefs-20130106_1_pension-fund-statepension-pension-theft; Asawin Suebsaeng, Editorial, Man Fires Assistant For Being Too Hot
and "Irresistible,"Iowa Court Says He's Within Legal Rights, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 21, 2012,
4:41 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/12/man-fires-assistant-being-hotand-irresistible-iowa-courts-says-he-legally-can; You're Irresistible. You're Fired. Punished
for a Boss' Lack of Self-Control, Op-Ed.,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Dec.
27, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-12-27/opinion/ct-edit-dental-1227-jm20121227 1 dental-assistant-dentist-discrimination.
87. See, e.g., Dana Ford, "Irresistible"Worker Fired in Iowa: "I Don't Think It's Fair,"CNN
(Dec. 25, 2012, 12:35 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/22/us/iowa-irresistibleworker/; Alyssa Newcomb & Tanya Rivero, Dental Assistant Firedfor Being "Irresistible"is
"Devastated," ABC (Dec. 23, 2012, 10:16 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines
/2012/12/melissa-nelson-dental-assistant-fired-for-being-irresistible-is -devastated/.
88. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. Knight's attorney spun it differently,
characterizing the court's decision as a victory for family values and men saving their
marriages.
See
Joe
Kemp,
Iowa
Court
OKs
Firing
of
Female
DentalAssistant for Being Too "IrresistiblyAttractive," N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 22, 2012, 8:09
PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/iowa-court-oks-firing-female-workerirresistibly-attractive-article-1.1226068.
89. See Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 73 (Iowa 2013); Nelson v.
James H. Knight DDS, P.C., No. 11-1857, 2012 WL 6652747, at *8 (Iowa Dec. 21, 2012),
withdrawn and supersededby Nelson, 834 N.W.2d 64.
90. Nelson, 2012 WL 6652747.
91. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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and (without additional briefing or arguments) 9 2 rendered a new
opinion on July 12, 2013.' The holding was the same, and other than
an added special concurrence by three justices, little changed in the
principal opinion. A comparison of the original and revised opinions,
which arrived at the same conclusion without relying on additional
briefing or argument, suggests that the court simply wished to further
explain the result in response to the public criticism. 94 Indeed, the new
special concurrence said as much: "These challenges to defining sex
discrimination in the workplace have, at times, created controversy
and divisiveness, especially when decisions by courts are not fully
explained or when court decisions are not fairly read and interpreted
or accepted."9 s
In the reissued opinion, the special concurrence written by Chief
Justice Cady and joined by two justices makes two major points in
addition to responding to the negative reaction after the December
decision. The first is that the employment discrimination laws only go
so far in impinging on the predominant legal principle of employment
at will. The concurrence states:
[T]he law does not escape some blame for the difficult nature of
the issue in light of the countervailing employment-at-will
doctrine, which permits employers to terminate employees for
reasons personal to them, so long as the will of the employer is
not discriminatory or otherwise against public policy. This law is
our Iowa law.96
The opinion closes by noting that "[w]ithout proof of sex
discrimination,

the

employment-at-will

doctrine

...

guides

the

outcome." The second major point the concurrence emphasized is
how the plaintiffs consensual close personal relationship with Knight
resulted in her termination."
92. See Ryan Koopmans, Iowa Supreme Court to Reconsider Case of "Irresistible
Employee," ON BRIEF (June 25, 2013, 10:56 PM), http://iowaappeals.com/iowa-supremecourt-to-reconsider-case-of-irresistible -employee/.
93. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d 64.
94. Indeed, Professor Todd Pettys said, "'It appears to me what they really wanted to
do was take another shot at explaining why they were reaching the conclusion that they did,
understanding that they had come under some criticism for that conclusion.'" See Kay
Henderson, Firing "Attractive"Assistant Is Legal-Iowa Court Reaffirms, REUTERS (July 12,
2013,
6:02
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/12/us-usa-dentist-sexidUSBRE96BOXA20130712?feedType=RSS&amp.
95. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 74 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially).
96. Id. at 75 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (citing Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc.,
613 N.W.2d 275,280-82 (Iowa 2000)).
97. Id at 81.
98. Id at 80.
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It will be interesting to see the public and media reaction to the
new opinion. The new special concurrence attempts to deflect criticism
by shifting attention or blame to at least three targets: media and
public misdepictions of the court's opinion, the employment-at-will
doctrine, and the conduct of plaintiff. The concurrence also suggests
that the court did its best with statutory language that "could not be
more general."9 9
Was the Iowa court's decision correct? The court considered the
most analogous precedent and most of the relevant issues. Although
those issues could have been resolved in the plaintiffs favor, the
court's decision was consistent with precedent, and its analysis was
thorough and careful. Although other courts may have found sex
discrimination, the Iowa court competently explained the problems
with Nelson's sex discrimination theory.'0 0 Thus, the Nelson case is the
latest high-profile example of terminations permissible under
employment at will because they are not quite covered by employment
discrimination law.' Given the sense of public outrage provoked by
this case, perhaps another theory would permit recovery in such cases.
B.

Other Termination Lawsuits Related to Appearance or Aspects of
Sex

The Nelson case is one of several recent cases in which the plaintiff
alleged that she was fired because of her appearance. 0 2 in some such
cases, the plaintiffs attempted to recover for sex discrimination but
faced some of the same impediments to recovery that Nelson did. In
2010, banker Deborahlee Lorenzana sued her employer for sex
discrimination, claiming she was told her fitted suits were too
provocative and distracting.10 3 Her story initially went viral as well but
eventually provoked something of a backlash when less-than
sympathetic stories emerged depicting Ms. Lorenzana as trying to

99. Id. at 74.
100. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
101. The reissued Nelson decision made clear that plaintiff did not assert a claim for
sexual harassment and the court did not decide how such a claim would have been resolved.
Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67, 72.
102. See generally William R. Corbett, Hotness Discrimination:Appearance Discrimination
as a Mirrorfor Reflecting on the Body of Employment-Discrimination Law, 60 CATH. U. L. REV.
615, 616 (2011) (detailing several cases involving "sex discrimination" that "focus[ed] on
appearance or hotness issues").
103. See Complaint at 2, Lorenzana v. CitiGroup Inc., No. 09116382 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nov.
20, 2009), available at http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/iscroll/SQLData.jsp?IndexNo
=116382-2009.
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capitalize on her appearance.' 0 4 Based on a mandatory arbitration
clause, Lorenzana's case was referred to arbitration,'o and according
to reports, the case was concluded and she recovered nothing.'06
At the other extreme on the irresistibility spectrum from the
Nelson and Lorenzana cases, a woman sued her former employer for
sex discrimination for rescinding an offer of employment, alleging that
the chief executive did not like her "body shape" and did not consider
her the kind of woman that he would like to sexually harass or with
whom he would want to have a sexual relationship.o' Although her
claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with contract
were dismissed, her sex discrimination claim under Title VII
survived. 0 '
In Shomo v. Junior Corp.,o a slightly different case that still
involved aspects of appearance and sex, the plaintiff, a waitress,
alleged that she had a sexual relationship with the restaurant's
owner." 0 When she told the owner that she was pregnant, he allegedly
told her that restaurant patrons preferred slender waitresses to
pregnant ones and offered to pay for an abortion."' When the plaintiff
refused to terminate the pregnancy, she was fired.112 She sued for her
termination under theories of sex and pregnancy discrimination and
the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy." 3 While her
Title VII discrimination claims survived a motion to dismiss, her
wrongful discharge tort claim did not. In its opinion, the court
acknowledged that Virginia recognizes a tort exception to employment
at will, but explained that it is a narrow exception and not every public
policy evidenced in the statutes can give rise to a claim for wrongful
104. See, e.g., Jessica Pressler, Debrahlee Lorenzana: "I Want to Be Tits on a Stick," N.Y.
(June 9, 2010, 9:50 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2010/06
/debraleelorenzana-i want to b.html.
105. See Brian Braiker & Alice Gomstyn, Sexy Citibank Ex-Employee: "I Love Plastic
Surgery," ABC NEWS (June 10, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/debrahleelorenzana-citigroup-case-employee-cosmetic-surgery/story?id=10872336.
106. See Bess Levin, Citi Would Like To Make It Clear It Did Not Pay Debrahlee Lorenzana
a Dime, DEALBREAKER
(May
22,
2012,
3:34
PM),
http://dealbreaker.com
/2012/05/citi-would-like-to-make-it-clear-it-did-not-pay-debrahlee-lorenzana-adime/#more-76999.
107. Brice v. Resch, No. 1:10-cv-00711-WCG, 2011 WL 284182, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24,
2011).
108. See id. at*5 (the motion to dismiss was granted only as to the torts).
109. Shomo v. Junior Corp., No. 7:11-cv-00508-JCT, 2012 WL 2401978, at *1 (W.D. Va.
June 1, 2012).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *1, 2.
113. Id.
MAG.
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discharge in violation of public policy.114 At the same time, the court
declared that "[t]erminating an employee simply because she refuses
to have an abortion offends the conscience of the Court.""i5
In a pending case "gone viral," the fired employee has alleged a
type of appearance discrimination that might permit recovery under
the Americans with Disabilities Act." 6 The case illustrates that some
aspects of appearance may constitute disabilities, although that would
not be so for general attractiveness or unattractiveness. Sandra Lupo, a
former hostess at a Hooters restaurant, alleges she was fired after she
had brain surgery, requiring her to have a "buzz" cut."' Lupo alleges
that Hooters required her to wear a wig, but she stopped wearing it
because she found that the wig impeded healing of her scar and made
it prone to infections. When she explained to her manager why she
could not wear a wig, he allegedly reduced her hours until she was
forced to quit. She filed a lawsuit alleging disability discrimination in
federal district court in Missouri."' Although Hooters denied the
allegations," 9 if they are proven, Lupo has a viable disability
discrimination claim. 20
Finally, sexual favoritism or paramour cases present similar issues
and also generally fall outside employment discrimination recovery.121
114. Id. at *5.
115. Id. at *7,13.
116. See FormerHooters Waitress SandraLupo Claims DiscriminationAfter Brain Surgery,
WTSP.COM
(Apr.
10,
2013,
10:24
AM),
http://www.wtsp.com/news/article
/310139/0/Former-Hooters-waitress-Sandra-Lupo-claims-discrimination-after-brainsurgery; Alysssa Newcomb, Hooters Waitress Says Post-Brain Surgery Appearance Cost Her
job, ABC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/hooters-waitress-postbrain-surgery-appearance-cost-job/story?id=18905769;
Rachel
Quigley,
Ex-Hooters
Waitress 'Forced Out of Herjob After Her Hair Was Shaved Off So She Could Undergo Brain
Surgery,' MAIL ONLINE (Apr. 8, 2013, 9:45 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2305766/Sandro-Lupo-Ex-Hooters-waitress-forced-job-shaved-head-undergo-brainsurgery.html#ixzz2VY48za65; Hunter Stuart, Sandra Lupo, Former Hooters Employee,
Forced To Quit After Brain Surgery, Lawsuit Alleges, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 10, 2013, 8:41
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/08/sadra-lupo-hooters-waitresslawsuit n 3039318
.html.
117. See supra note 116.
118. See Sarah Rae Fruchtnicht, Missouri Hooters Waitress Sandra Lupo Forced to Quit
After Brain Surgery, Sues for Discrimination, OPPOSING VIEWS (Apr. 8, 2013),
http://www.opposingviews.com/i/society/crime/missouri-waitress-forced-out-hootersjob -after-brain-surgery-sues -discrimination.
119. See WTSP.com, supra note 116.
120. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2011); Missouri Human
Rights Act, 213 Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 213.010-213.126 (2012).
121. EEOC, N-915.048, POLicY GUIDANCE ON EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII FOR SEXUAL
FAVORITISM (Jan. 12, 1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/sexualfavor.html
("Not all types of sexual favoritism violate Title VII. It is the Commission's position that Title
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As discussed above, the Eighth Circuit used these types of cases by
analogy in Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co.122 For example, in Kelly v.
Howard L Shaprio & Associates Consulting Engineers,12 3 the plaintiff,
who had worked for the employer for twenty-eight years, quit because
she alleged the workplace had become permeated with sexual
favoritism. 2 4 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that one of the company
vice presidents, who was her brother, engaged in a sexual affair with a
subordinate employee.125 The plaintiff tried to dissuade the vice
president from pursuing the relationship because of its effect on the
workplace.126 The plaintiff alleged that, in response, her duties and
authority were downgraded in favor of the vice president's paramour,
who also was accorded workplace privileges and not required to
submit to the plaintiffs authority.127 The plaintiff quit and sued for
hostile environment sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII
and state employment discrimination law. The Second Circuit affirmed
dismissal of the plaintiffs hostile environment claim because a
preference for a paramour is not discrimination "because of" sex.128
Additionally, the court affirmed dismissal of the retaliation claim
because the plaintiff could not have possessed a good faith belief that
the alleged conduct violated employment discrimination laws, and her
employer could not have understood that to be her complaint.129
The Nelson case and others exemplify cases in which women
allege they were fired for their appearance or some related aspect of
sex. Many of these suits claim sex, disability, or age discrimination, and
sometimes the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
Sex discrimination claims sometimes succeed, but more often they do
not, as in the Nelson case. If the statutorily based sex discrimination
theory is inadequate to accommodate these cases, perhaps a tort
theory could fill the gap .13 The Shomo case illustrates that WDVPP
VII does not prohibit isolated instances of preferential treatment based upon consensual
romantic relationships.").
122. 446 F.3d 903, 910 (8th Cir. 2006). For discussion of Tenge within the Nelson case,
see supra text accompanying notes 67-75.
123. 716 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2013).
124. Id at 12-13.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id at 17.
129. Id at 16-17.
130. Professor Chamallas has argued persuasively that IIED should be viewed as more
than a mere gap filler and should be used to augment the law of sexual harassment. See
Chamallas, supra note 32. While I agree with that position, my argument here is that the
gap-filler function is very important for tort law. Nimble tort theory should fill gaps in areas
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seems most suited to this purpose, but proves to be inadequate to the
task.
III. LOOKING FOR ATORT TO FILL THE GAP: THE HISTORIC INADEQUACY OF
TORT THEORIES INEMPLOYMENT TERMINATION CASES
Terminations that elicit societal outrage are not new. Many other
very bad reasons for discharge, beyond sex or appearance, offend
ordinary sensibilities. As certainly as American law has embraced
employment at will as the foundational and default rule for
employment terminations, it is clear that some terminations are so
unfair that our society cannot countenance them without providing
legal recourse.13 ' This fact is indicated by both the numerous legal
exceptions to employment at will 3 2 and the outraged reactions to
terminations like Nelson's. Termination is the "capital punishment" of
employment in that it is the most severe adverse employment action
that an employer can impose on an employee.
Employment discrimination law does not provide an adequate
limitation on employment at will because its particular purposes are
deterring and eradicating invidious discrimination in employment,134
rather than serving as a general wrongful discharge law. Forcing
employment discrimination law to protect against wrongful discharges
would distort and discredit it, and jeopardize its principal objectives.13
where more ossified bodies of law, such as employment discrimination, do not provide
reliable redress.
131. See, e.g., Donald C. Carroll, At- Will Employment: The Arc ofjustice Bends Towards the
Doctrine's Rejection, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 655, 672 (2012) ("The sum total of all these exceptions
to the at-will rule reflect a deep-seated dissatisfaction with the at-will rule and with the
economic free play of the liberty of contract. The dissatisfaction is moral in nature,
implicating a piecemeal evolution of a moral consensus that the at-will rule does not serve
our deepest values as a people.").
132. There are statutory exceptions and common law exceptions, both contract- and
tort-based. See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
133. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 986
(5th ed. 2003); Paul Berks, Social Change and judicial Response: The Handbook Exception to
Employment-at-Will, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.231,248 n.59 (2000).
134. See Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: job Security Protections and Equal
Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 77-78 (2007).
135. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Workplace in a Racially Diverse Society: Preliminary
Thoughts on the Role of Labor and Employment Law, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 49, 81 (1998)
(positing that some who regard themselves as non-protected employees may believe that
protected employees are getting preferential treatment because employers must review
adverse decisions carefully when dealing with what they believe to be protected classes);
Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful DischargeProtectionsin an At-Will World, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1655,
1679 (1996) (explaining that the combination of antidiscrimination laws and at-will
employment practice may add to the tension between what are regarded as protected
groups and other employees because the latter normally have no recourse against unfair
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In addition, employment discrimination law would not provide a
reliable source of redress because of its byzantine proof structuresl 36
and focus on proof of an unlawful discriminatory motive. Substantial
empirical research and commentary address the relative lack of
success of employment discrimination plaintiffs compared with
plaintiffs asserting other types of claims. 3 1 In light of these problems
with employment discrimination law, tort law may provide a better
remedy for egregious discharges on the fringes of employment
discrimination. 39 After all, tort law is a "mirror" for reflecting changes
in society.' 4 0 To the extent that society cannot tolerate some
terminations, tort law should be counted on to provide a reliable
restriction and remedy.
This Section considers two tort theories: WDVPP and IIED.
Although WDVPP was tailor-made for providing redress for
employment terminations, it has been of very limited utility in
providing a tort limitation on employment at will. Instead, IIED holds
more promise for filling the legal gap and providing a tort bulwark
against employment at will. However, for IIED to fill that role, courts
must adjust their concept of the tort in the context of employment.

terminations while the former likely have a remedy under the antidiscrimination laws); Ann
C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National
Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1489-90 (1996) (similarly discussing the "backlash
by members of unprotected classes to members of classes protected by the civil rights
statutes"). In reality, Title VII covers all races, sexes, etc., but employers and employees
perceive the difficulty of prevailing in reverse discrimination cases.
136. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 32, at 2176-77 (stating that "[a]s Title VII has
matured, it has become increasingly complex and rigid"); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking
DiscriminationLaw, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 71 (2011) (positing that the rigid proof structures
that control employment discrimination law have "led to doctrinal, procedural, and
theoretical confusion within employment discrimination law and ... mired the field in
endless questions about frameworks rather than in addressing the field's core issues").
137. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 32, at 2178.
138. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
139. Cf Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1539,
1564 (1997) (expressing a preference for new torts over "avigorous display of group-based
activism"); Chamallas, supra note 32, at 2178 (considering IIED as a basis for recovering for
sexual harassment and observing that "[g]iven the limitations of Title VII, not surprisingly
there has been a turn to tort law, in which plaintiffs are not required to pinpoint the
motivation behind their harassment or mistreatment in order to recover").
140. See Ballam, supra note 36, at 656; Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What
Torts ScholarshipCan Teach Us About the American Experience, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1567, 1569
(1995) ("Tort jurisprudence is a relatively accurate reflector of American society's basic
principles for microgovernance.").
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Wrongful Dischargein Violation of Public Policy:A Feckless Tort
With No Potentialto Remedy Outrageous Terminations

Wrongful discharge in violation of public policy could have been
the tort of choice for abusive discharges,14 ' but instead it has
developed as a narrow and unreliable restriction on employment at
will. Notwithstanding the power and pervasiveness of employment at
will, many people in the United States do not think that employers
should or can fire workers without a good reason or for bad reasons.142
While it is hardly uncommon to hear workers and lawyers say that an
employee was "wrongfully" or "unfairly" discharged, one must wonder,
in the land of employment at will, what they mean by that. WDVPP
could have been the tort theory that provided relief in unfair
termination cases. Nevertheless, substantial problems have arisen in
plaintiffs' use of WDVPP to challenge wrongful terminations. First,
courts have struggled with the tort's link between termination and
jeopardy to public policy. Second, although states recognize different
versions of WDVPP, most only recognize fairly limited factual scenarios
in which the tort may apply. Ultimately, courts probably find ways to
deny recovery for WDVPP claims because they are solicitous of
preserving a powerful, overarching employment at will principle,
which permits only narrow and rare exceptions. 4 3 In addition to these
specific weaknesses, the mere existence of this vapid tort with its
deceptively promising name may persuade many that no tort theory is
needed for bad terminations because one already exists.
The tort of WDVPP was created to address some terminations that
even a society governed by employment at will was unwilling to
permit. The tort first appeared in the late 1950s in California,' 44 gained
momentum with the publication of Professor Lawrence Blades's article
in 1967,1'4 and eventually was adopted by all but about five or six
states. 4 6 Blades's article was influential in the movement to recognize
141. See Ballam, supra note 36, at 656 (describing WDVPP as "[t]he most significant
limitation on the employment-at-will doctrine [that] has arisen from tort law").
142. See Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does
It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 6 (2002); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect
Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83
CORNELL L.REV. 105, 106 (1997).
143. See supra Part I.A.
144. See Petermann v. Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27-28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959).
145. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. IndividualFreedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1421-27 (1967).
146. There is some uncertainty because in some states there are few reported decisions
addressing the viability of such a claim. One treatise states that "[a]s of 2003, the courts of
45 states and the District of Columbia had recognized the public policy exception to the at-
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tort limitations on employment at will. However, because the WDVPP
tort recognized by states required a link between a termination and
the jeopardizing of public policy, this resulted in a much narrower tort
than the one proposed by Blades.' 47 Although the general recognition
of some version of WDVPP by most states may lead some to call it a
successful tort,14 8 it has been an abject failure in providing a reliable
theory for overcoming employment at will in cases of abusive
discharge. 4 9
The requisite connection between a termination and jeopardy to
public policy is, as one court explained, "the Achilles heel of the
[tort]."'s Courts struggle with finding the source of public policy,
determining whether the termination at issue poses a threat to the
public policy, and balancing the public policy with employment at will.
In many cases, a plaintiff identifies what seems to be one or more
viable public policies in state constitutional provisions or statutes, only
to have the court declare that the legislature did not contemplate a
remedy for employment terminations linked to that public policy."s

will rule in one or more factual settings." PAUL H. TOBIAS, LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
CLAIMS pt. 1, § 5.3 (June 2013) (listing cases for each state that had recognized the tort).
However, the qualifier "in one or more factual settings" is important because some states,
such as Louisiana, do not recognize the tort, but have enacted a statute that covers some
branches of WDVPP. Id. The following states appear not to recognize the common law tort
of WDVPP: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, New York, and Rhode Island. One
could take issue with some of these. Id. For example, Tobias's treatise cites at least one New
York case that recognizes the tort: Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992). Although
the Wieder case permitted a discharged employee to recover, it appears to have been on an
implied covenant rationale, not WDVPP. Id. at 109.
147. Specifically, Blades proposed adopting a tort modeled on the abuse of process tort,
in which the tortfeasor exercises a right, but acts with bad motives or without justification.
See Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model Employment
Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 868 n.100 (1994) ("Blades persuasively argued ... for
adoption of the tort of 'abusive discharge,' which would reach beyond the limits of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy."). Blades's proposal, however, gave impetus to the
recognition of a more limited tort-wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. See
Ballam, supra note 36, at 664 (stating that, as of the 1990s, "courts were far from adopting
Blades's recommendation").
148. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 139, at 1541.
149. See, e.g., Bammertv. Don's Super Valu, Inc., 2002 WI 85, 25-27, 254 Wis. 2d. 347,
646 N.W.2d 365 (recognizing tension between WDVPP and employment at will, and
denying recovery).
150. Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981).
151. See, e.g., Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (referring to the
Pennsylvania statutes on domestic abuse and crime victim compensation cited by plaintiff,
the court stated that "while these statutes provide certain procedures and protections, they
do not thereby create a protected employment class ... [and the abuse statute] does not...
say that a complainant is entitled to any kind of employment rights or benefits").
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52
In one case, Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital,1
the
Arizona Supreme Court permitted a plaintiff to recover under WDVPP
for allegedly being fired for refusing to "moon" the audience during a
performance of the song "Moon River."'s The court found the public
policy implicated was a criminal law prohibiting indecent exposure.114
The Arizona legislature bristled at the court's declaration of the state's
public policy and quickly responded by enacting the Arizona
Employment Protection Act,'s in which the legislature statutorily
recognized the tort but limited the judiciary's power to determine
public policy.'5 6
An additional problem with the public policy requirement is that
when a plaintiff attempts to invoke a public policy under a statute, such
as employment discrimination statutes, some courts disallow the
claims either because the legislature provided an adequate and
exclusive remedy in the statute 5 7 or because that federal or state law

preempts state tort law recovery."s

Courts' inconsistent approaches to identifying public policy and
linking public policies to terminations have led some to question
whether the tort really has anything to do with public policy. Professor
Peck characterized the search for public policy as a disguise for what
the courts actually have been doing-"revising and rejecting the
employment-at-will doctrine because they sensed that it was no longer
acceptable in contemporary society,"s 9 and "providing needed job
protection for employees who have none." 60 On the other hand, Dean
Schwab argues that what courts actually are doing is permitting

152. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).
153. Id. at 1029.
154. Id. at 1035-36.
155. 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws 683-84 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (2012))
(providing "[w]hile courts interpret the common law, ... they are not authorized to
establish a cause of action in connection with specific acts or omissions that constitute a
violation of the public policy of this state").
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Lachler v. Nicholas, No. LLICV116004557S, 2012 WL 1759725, at*2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2012); Kimmelman v. Heather Downs Mgmt Ltd., 753 N.W.2d 265, 268
(Mich. Ct. App. 2008); Clinton v. State ex rel. Logan Cnty. Election Bd., 2001 OK 52,
9, 29
P.3d 543, 546.
158. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990) (holding that
ERISA preempted state tort law claim regarding termination before pension vested);
Ahanotu v. Mass. Tpk. Auth., 466 F. Supp. 2d 378, 388-89 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that state
discrimination law provided exclusive remedy for employment discrimination claims, thus
preempting claim for WDVPP).
159. Cornelius J. Peck, PenetratingDoctrinalCamouflage: Understandingthe Development
of the Law of Wrongful Discharge,66 WASH. L. REV. 719, 772 (1991).
160. Id.
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recovery when the termination produces deleterious third-party
effects.16 ' Regardless of one's evaluation and synthesis of the cases on
WDVPP, it is true that there are a number of approaches to public
policy, the results are often unpredictable, and many courts have
interpreted the public policy requirement as imposing a significant
restriction on the tort's coverage of abusive discharge cases.
A second problem with the tort of WDVPP is that there are four
general factual scenarios in which the tort is recognized, and not all
states recognize all four. 6 2 If the case does not fit a type recognized by
the state, most courts deny recovery. The four general categories of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are as follows: (1)
refusal to participate in unlawful conduct (2) exercising a statutory
right (3) fulfilling a public obligation; and (4) whistleblowing.16 3 A
handful of states have gone beyond the four types and recognized
WDVPP if four elements are satisfied: clear public policy, jeopardy,
causation, and no overriding justification. 6 4
WDVPP could have been the tort theory that would have provided
a significant tort restriction on employment at will, and it could have
permitted recovery for terminations like that of Melissa Nelson and
other appearance-based and sex-tainted discharges.' 6 5 However, there
are problems with the tort of WDVPP that make it an unpredictable
and unreliable theory of recovery for employment terminations that
are viewed as reprehensible by society. Fundamentally, the problem is
indicated by the name of the tort: what connection is required between
a wrongful termination and a public policy that is allegedly jeopardized
by the termination? Many courts are reluctant boldly to declare public
policy.'66
Beyond the problems with the elements of the tort, there is a more
significant limitation on the tort. The biggest impediment to a viable
161. Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge and the Search for Third-Party Effects, 74
TEx. L. REV. 1943, 1945 (1996).
162. See, e.g., Johnston v. Del Mar Distrib. Co., 776 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)
(explaining that Texas only recognizes the tort of WDVPP relating to a refusal to participate
in unlawful activity).
163. See, e.g., Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 379 (Wash. 1996).
164. Ohio and perhaps Iowa recognize the four-elements approach. See Dohme v. Eurand
Am., Inc., 130 Ohio St. 3d 168, 2011-Ohio-4609, 956 N.E.2d 825, at 12-16; Newell v. JDS
Holdings, L.L.C., 834 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013).
165. Cf Ballam, supra note 36, at 664-65 (recognizing that courts adopting WDVPP were
adopting a version far less expansive than Professor Blades's recommendation and
questioning whether WDVPP could evolve to significantly erode employment-at-will).
166. The New York Court of Appeals, for example, has rejected calls to recognize the tort,
explaining that it would leave recognition of such a tort to the legislature. See Murphy v. Am.
Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983).
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tort is the judiciary's unwillingness to allow WDVPP to encroach on the
employment-at-will doctrine.16 It is common for courts to reject
modest expansions of WDVPP and explain that they are doing so to
preserve employment at will. For example, in Bammert v. Don's Super
Valu, Inc.,' 68 the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the WDVPP
claim of a store cashier who claimed she was fired because her
policeman husband assisted in arresting the store owner's wife for
drunk driving.16 9 The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs
claim, explaining that, although the plaintiff did identify relevant public
policies, she could not recover because she was not the one who
participated in the conduct in support of the public policies.'7 0 The
court stated its reluctance to broaden the narrow WDVPP theory of
recovery it had recognized because employment at will is a "stable
fixture" of the common law of the state and is "central to the free
market economy.""' Further, the court stated that "[t]he employmentat-will doctrine thus inhibits judicial 'second-guessing' of discharge
decisions-even those that are unfair, unfortunate, or harsh."172
Accordingly, the court affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs claim. 7 1
Thus, courts' insistence on keeping WDVPP narrow can be seen as a
strong impulse to preserve the strength, vitality, and scope of
employment at will.174
B.

The CurrentWeakness of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In contrast to WDVPP, IIED is not a tort that was designed for
employment law or terminations. Instead, the tort emerged from
efforts to unleash parasitic damages for emotional distress from other
torts.17s Before the recognition of the freestanding tort of IIED,
167. See, e.g., Bammert v. Don's Super Valu, Inc., 2002 WI 85, 10, 254 Wis. 2d 347, 646
N.W.2d 365 (recognizing tension between WDVPP and employment-at-will and denying
recovery).
168. 2002 WI 85, 10,254Wis. 2d 347,646 N.W.2d 365.
169. See id. at 367.
170. See id. at 370-71.
171. Id. at 369.
172. Id. at 370.
173. The dissent argued that, despite reluctance to impinge upon employment-at-will, a
narrow expansion of WDVPP was appropriate under the facts of the case and posed no great
threat to employment-at-will. See id. at 374-75 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
174. See, e.g., Briggs v. Nova Servs., 213 P.3d 910, 914 (Wash. 2009) (stating that "the
tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is a narrow exception to this
employment at-will doctrine [and] [t]he exception should be applied cautiously so as to not
swallow the rule") (citation omitted); White v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 163 Ohio App. 3d 416,
2005-Ohio-5086, 837 N.E.2d 1275, at
10-11 (recognizing narrow exception to
employment-at-will).
175. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 823-25 (2000).
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emotional distress damages could be recovered only if some other
physical contact and damage could be established under an existing
tort theory.'76 The first cases to recognize a cause of action for
freestanding emotional distress involved special duties imposed on
common carriers and innkeepers to exercise civility toward their
customers."' Then, courts began "stretching" to find a physical impact
so that they could award emotional distress damages."' From those
mounting exceptions to the rule that emotional distress damages were
recoverable only if an existing tort could be established, the work of
academics, including Professors William Prosser and Calvin
Magruder,"' 9 and the enshrinement of IIED in the 1948 supplement to
the first Restatement of Torts,' prompted courts to recognize IIED, or
the tort of outrage.'"' IIED is now officially recognized in all but two
states, and the highest courts of those states seem receptive to
recognizing the tort under appropriate facts. 8 2
IIED is perhaps the most amorphous of all intentional torts,1 3
requiring severe emotional distress caused by outrageous conduct that
176. See, e.g., Russell Fraker, Note, Reformulating Outrage: A Critical Analysis of the
ProblematicTortoflIED, 61 VAND. L. REV. 983, 987 (2008).
177. DoBBs, supra note 173, at 824-25.
178. Id. at825.
179. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 32, at 2151 (describing IIED as "a tort created by
academics"); see also Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and
Employment at Will: The Case Against "Tortification"of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U.
L. REV. 387, 393 n.17 (1994) (recognizing role of academic advocacy in recognition of the
tort and citing several influential law journal articles); Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense
of the Role of the Collateral Torts in Wrongful Termination Litigation, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1693,
1705 (1996) (discussing the workof Prosser and Magruder).
180. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: 1948 SUPPLEMENT, Torts § 46 (1949); see also
Chamallas, supra note 32, at 2151 (citing the recognition of IIED as a separate tort in the
supplement to the first Restatement as the "official birth" of the tort).
181. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandness:Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 42, 42 (1982).
182. In 1994, Professor Dennis Duffy stated that only Michigan, Montana, and
Pennsylvania did not recognize the tort. See Duffy, supra note 179, at 390 n.7. Since that
time Montana has recognized the tort. Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d
411, 429 (Mont. 1995). The Michigan Supreme Court has never officially recognized IIED,
but it has suggested that it might under an appropriate set of facts. See Hubbard v. Prison
Health Servs., No. 10-14390, 2011 WL 4373981 at *9 (E.D. Mich. July 29, 2011) (citing
Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 374 N.W.2d 905 (Mich. 1985)). Similarly, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has never recognized the tort, but it has indicated receptiveness to the
Restatement (Second) elements as the minimum requirements. See Wilson v. American Gen.
Fin. Inc., 807 F. Supp. 2d 291, 302-03 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Taylor v. Albert Einstein Med.
Ctr., 754 A.2d 650, 653 (Pa. 2000)).
183. See, e.g., Frank J. Cavico, The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the
Private Employment Sector, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 116-17 (2003) (discussing that
"outrageousness" lacks a specific definition); Gergen, supra note 179, at 1695 (stating that
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exceeds the bounds that ought to be tolerated by civilized society.18 4
Reviewing many cases of successful IIED claims, commentators have
identified several characteristics, one or more of which characterize
most of those claims: (1) abusing a position of power; (2) taking
advantage of a vulnerable or susceptible person; (3) repeating acts that
would not be considered intolerable but for the repetition; and (4)
committing acts of physical violence or threatening serious economic
harm to person or property in which the plaintiff is known to have a
special interest.' Nonetheless, it has been a largely unavailing theory
for plaintiffs generally,'86 and for terminated employees specifically.'
Due to lingering concerns with recovery for just emotional distress,
courts often grant summary judgment on IIED claims, holding as a
matter of law that the conduct at issue is not outrageous and/or that
the defendant did not intend to cause severe emotional distress."
Indeed, the Restatement (Second), while giving its imprimatur to the
tort, bestowed the initial weakness that it still bears: "Complete
emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some
degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price
of living among people. The law intervenes only where the distress
inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to
endure it.""' 9 Thus, IIED is potentially both one of the most broadly
applicable torts and a tort theory that courts have been most reluctant
to apply broadly.'9 o
As difficult as it has been for plaintiffs generally to recover for
IIED, plaintiffs in employment cases, particularly those involving
terminations, have found courts particularly reluctant to permit
what employers fear about IIED is the unknown and describing IIED as one of the formless
torts); Alex B. Long, Lawyers IntentionallyInflicting Emotional Distress, 42 SETON HALL L. REV.
55, 60 (2012) (stating that it is "it is difficult, if not impossible, to state with precision what
actions qualify as extreme and outrageous").
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
185. DOBBS,supra note 175, at 827.
186. See Fraker,supra note 176, at 984, 996 (describing it as a disfavored cause of action
and "The Tort of Last Resort"); Long, supra note 183, at 56 (quipping that IIED is
"predictable in the sense that most plaintiffs lose").
187. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 179, at 1696.
188. See, e.g., Chamallas,supra note 32, at 2117 (describing "a considerable reluctance
on the part of courts to intrude upon other areas of law or to interfere with what is
perceived to be an exercise of the defendant's legal rights"); Gergen, supra note 179, at 1706
(explaining that IIED was not vexing until cases presented the question "whether liability
might exist for conduct that is privileged or immunized under another body of law").
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965).
190. See Chamallas,supra note 32, at 2117 (noting that IIED represents both "expansive
protection" of tort law and courts' "considerable reluctance ... to intrude upon other areas
of law").
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recovery. As with WDVPP, courts fear permitting a substantial tort
incursion on employment at will."' Some courts adopting this a
restrictive approach to IED have cited a comment in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts: "The actor is never liable ... where he has done no
more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even
though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause
emotional distress."192 Believing that employment at will is a
sacrosanct principle of law, some courts fear that permitting recovery
for one termination case under IED will open the floodgates and
jeopardize employment at will. 9 3
The Texas courts are representative of the restrictive approach to
IED applied to workplace claims and terminations, and plaintiffs
asserting IED claims for workplace incidents have lost most of these
cases.194 The Texas Supreme Court explained this approach in GTE
Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce"s: "to properly manage its business, an
employer must be able to supervise, review, criticize, demote, transfer,
and discipline employees. Although many of these acts are necessarily
unpleasant for the employee, an employer must have latitude to
exercise these rights in a permissible way, even though emotional
distress results."' 96 The court in GTE Southwest cited numerous Texas
cases following this restrictive approach.' 97 Nevertheless, the Texas
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiffs on an IED claim,
given the supervisor's "repeated or ongoing severe harassment" of his
subordinate employees.' 98 GTE Southwest was not a termination case,
but it did slightly liberalize the standard for outrageous conduct in

191. In 1994, Professor Duffy declared that "the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
either do not recognize the tort in the employment-at-will context, or place severe
restrictions on liability in that context." Duffy, supra note 179, at 391; see also Cavico, supra
note 183, at 157-61 (describing reluctance of courts to permit IIED to be used as a
backdoor wrongful discharge claim); Gergen, supra note 179, at 1702 (observing that
"[d]espite the apparent openness of the tort, infliction claims by employees rarely
succeed"). Although there has been some expansion of application of lIED to terminations in
some states since Duffy's statement, there is still considerable reticence on the part of
courts.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1965); see, e.g., GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce,
998 S.W.2d 605, 611-12 (Tex. 1999).
193. See, e.g., Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex.
1992) (stating "there would be little left of the employment-at-will doctrine" if it permitted
recovery under IIED).
194. See, e.g., Cavico, supra note 183, at 120-22; Duffy, supra note 179, at 404-11;
Gergen, supra note 179, at 1728-30.
195. 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999).
196. Id. at 612.
197. See id.
198. Id. at 616.
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Texas in the workplace setting. Yet, the principle that courts should
rarely permit a successful IIED claim for employment termination
remains vibrant in Texas case law after GTE Southwest.'99
Notwithstanding the limited success of plaintiffs in some states, it
is very difficult for plaintiffs to win on IIED claims, and this is even
more pronounced in employment cases, and even more so in cases
involving terminations. Nonetheless, IIED is the tort theory that
possesses the most potential for a tort limitation on employment at
will. To realize that promise, however, courts must adjust their
conception of IIED.
C. An Exemplar: WDVPP and IIED Applied to An Egregious
Termination
One case of a particularly egregious termination of a female
employee is Green v. Bryant,200 in which Ms. Bryant worked at a
doctor's office.2 0 1 While not at work, she was attacked by her estranged
husband, who beat her with a pipe and raped her at gunpoint.20 2 When
she reported for work, she was fired, apparently because the employer
feared that her violent spouse might come to her workplace and injure
people. 20 3 Bryant sued for wrongful termination based on legal
theories of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 20 4 The court denied recovery on all theories, granting a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 20 5 The court's decision
provides an prime example of why tort theories have not been filling
the gap on abusive discharges.
The court rejected Bryant's claim under the theory of WDVPP.
Bryant identified two public policies: protecting an employee's right to
privacy and protecting victims of crime or spousal abuse.206 The court
found with respect to privacy that the employer did not violate

199. See, e.g., City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 217 (Tex. 2000); Sw. Bell
Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Franco, 971 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by
Intercontinental Grp. P'ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2009); Gergen,
supra note 179, at 1703 (stating, before GTE Southwest was decided, that "conduct which
normally or naturally occurs in a termination cannot be considered morally outrageous as a
matter of law").
200. 887 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
201. Id.
202. Seeid.at800.
203. Seeid.at800n.2.
204. Seeid.at800.
205. See id. at 801.
206. See id.
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Bryant's privacy by terminating her.207 She disclosed the attack by her
estranged spouse, and the employer did not pry into her privacy. With
respect to the second public policy, the court explained that although
the statutes cited by plaintiff did create certain procedures and
protections for victims of crime and domestic abuse, they did not
"create a protected employment class" and did not provide a person
with employment rights or benefits. 20 8 Finally, the court noted that the
claim did not fit any of the categories of WVDPP recognized in
Pennsylvania. 20 9 Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff could
not recover under the Pennsylvania tort of WDVPP.
Turning to IIED, the court first explained that it is rare that
conduct in the employment context will reach the level of
outrageousness, which is an essential element of IIED. 210 The court
stated that although it could "contemplate circumstances" in which a
termination would satisfy the requirement of outrageousness, this was
not the case: "[Plaintiff] alleges only that she was fired because she was
the victim of a violent crime. Although any involuntary discharge from
employment is unpleasant, defendant's conduct was not so outrageous
in character or extreme in degree as to exceed all bounds of
decency. "211 The court rejected Bryant's IIED theory quite simply
because it concluded as a matter of law that firing an employee
because she was a victim of crime and domestic abuse is not
outrageous conduct. 21 2 While it may seem surprising that a court
would declare as a matter of law that such conduct is not extreme or
outrageous, the message and theme are more employment-specific. As
the court explained, terminations from employment, while unpleasant,
ordinarily do not satisfy outrageousness. 21 3 Indeed, in an employmentat-will state, that general principle must be true or else employers
would be held liable for doing what the law says they are entitled to
do. 214

The Green court's analysis and conclusions regarding each tort
may be criticized and debated. The court did expose the problems and
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 802.
211. Id. at 802.
212. Seeid.at803.
213. See id.
at 802.
214. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORT LAW: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARMS
§ 46 cmt. e (2012); Gergen, supra note 179, at 1703-04 (arguing that "conduct which
normally or naturally occurs in a termination cannot be considered morally outrageous as a
matter of law").
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shortcomings with the tort of WDVPP; however, although the court
also demonstrated the weakness of the tort of IIED as currently
conceived in the context of abusive discharges, as explained below,
IIED has greater flexibility and potential than WDVPP.
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING IIED TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY FOR
OUTRAGEOUS TERMINATIONS
In spite of IIED's current feebleness when pitted against
employment at will, IIED can be refashioned to navigate a middle
ground between categorically denying recovery and liberally
permitting recovery. While IIED, as currently conceived, does not
provide a reliable theory for recovery in termination cases implicating
appearance and/or sex, it is tort law's most promising theory, and it
can be reconceived to fill this role. Furthermore, given the role that
IIED has played in sexual harassment cases, reconceptualizing it to
provide relief in appearance- and sex-tainted terminations should be a
logical evolution.
A.

Incipient Promise of IIED to Provide a Remedy for EgregiousFirings

What is promising about IIED as a wrongful discharge theory for
some cases on the edge of employment discrimination? To begin with,
the core element of outrage is a formless concept, and any type of
conduct, including employment termination, could satisfy it.2 15
Furthermore, there has been some movement in the law that suggests
IIED could become a viable wrongful discharge theory for some
terminations carried out for bad reasons. The first such development is
the emergence of the concept of "discharge with dignity" and the
successful assertion of IIED claims in cases involving discharges
carried out in ways that humiliated the employee. 216 The second
development is the interaction between sexual harassment law and
IIED and the successful assertion of IIED claims in cases involving
sexual harassment.
In some cases, various courts have permitted IIED claims in the
termination context by reasoning, explicitly or implicitly, that although
215. One commentator suggests that the antiquated word "outrage" is part of the
problem with the tort. See Fraker, supra note 176, at 1022 (arguing that "'outrage' is a
remarkably deficient description, not only in being antiquated and vague, but because it
focuses attention on the response of a hypothetical third party").
216. See, e.g., Chamallas,supra note 32, at 2181 (citing the Restatement (Third) of Torts
for the proposition that "the new Restatement does authorize a claim in cases where an
employer 'goes so far beyond what is necessary to exercise the right [to fire an at-will
employee]' and 'unnecessarily humiliates a fired employee' ").
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employers have the right to discharge employees for any reason, that
right does not entitle them to execute the termination in a humiliating
or demeaning way. 217 The comments to the Restatement (Third) of
Torts indicate a shift from the Restatement (Second) toward
recognizing the "discharge with dignity" cases:
An actor can intentionally or recklessly cause severe emotional
harm while exercising a legal right. ...

[A]n employer who

terminates an at-will employee might be substantially certain
that the conduct will cause severe emotional harm, but neither is
liable for that conduct. Otherwise, the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional harm would undermine well-established
principles of marital law and employment law.
Although an actor exercising legal rights is not liable under
this Section merely for exercising those rights, the actor is not
immunized from liability if the conduct goes so far beyond what
is necessary to exercise the right that it is extreme and
outrageous. ... [A]n employer who unnecessarily humiliates a

fired employee goes further than is necessary to exercise the
legal right and may be subject to liability if the conduct is found
to be extreme and outrageous. 2 18
At this time, however, the cases denying recovery for IIED in the
context of termination far outnumber the successful discharge-withdignity claimS.219
The second development that bodes well for the more expansive
successful use of IIED in the employment termination context is the
successful assertion of IIED along with sexual harassment claims.
Although there has been some resistance to permitting IIED recovery
in conjunction with sexual harassment, 220 such cases have been one of

217. See, e.g., Bristow v. Drake St., Inc., 41 F.3d 345, 349 (7th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that
"no one should have to put up with such abuse"); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d
315, 318-19 (Mass. 1976) (explicitly applying IIED in the employment context). Cf GTE Sw.,
Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 611-13 (Tex. 1999) (although not a termination case, the
court permits an IIED recovery because of the supervisor's humiliating supervisory
methods).
218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 46
cmt. e (2012).
219. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 35, at 71-75 (discussing egregious termination cases
that plaintiffs lost, including Bryant v. Green).
220. See Cavico, supra note 183, at 156 (stating that "courts typically hold that sexual
harassment ... does not necessarily equate to a finding of [IIED]"); Chamallas, supra note 32,
at 2127-29 (stating that proving sexual harassment is not sufficient to guarantee tort
recovery).

CITE AS 92 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 50

50

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

the most successful types of IIED cases. 2 2 1 Professor Chamallas notes
that there are various defenses and arguments used to prevent the
overlap of employment discrimination/harassment law and torts,
including preemption 22 2 and states' workers' compensation laws
providing the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries.223 Still, the
relative success of IIED claims combined with sexual harassment
claims suggests a liberalization of IIED and potential for further
expansion.
B.

Why a More Expansive Application of lIED to Terminations is
Appropriate

Arguments regarding the appropriate role of the tort of outrage in
employment law are not new. It has been argued that courts'
receptiveness to IIED has "tortified" labor and employment law, and
this trend is not a good development. 224 It has been argued, at the other
extreme, that IIED should be expanded to provide a remedy for
pervasive supervisor abuse of employees. 2 25 Between these positions is
the argument that IIED (and other "collateral torts") are doing what
they should do-essentially patrolling the outer perimeter of
employment law and providing recovery in only the most egregious
cases. 2 26 Professor Chamallas provides a more nuanced position,
arguing that courts should abandon the approach that torts apply to
workplace claims only as a default if no other theory fits. Rather, she
argues that courts should allow a migration of principles from
employment discrimination/civil rights law to tort law, rather than
viewing tort law as distinct from, and a gap filler for, civil rights law.227
Specifically, she argues for sexual harassment law to migrate to and
inform IIED.228
This Article proposes a similarly expansive use of IIED in the
employment context, but the rationale is somewhat different from
others. It has been argued before that tort law should play the role of

221. See, e.g., Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532, 538-39 (La. 1992); Gergen, supra
note 179, at 1702 (stating that a "majority of successful infliction claims by employees
involve persistent sexual demands or lewd behavior").
222. See Chamallas, supra note 32, at 2135-36.
223. Seeid.at2137-39.
224. Duffy, supra note 179,passim.
225. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional
Infliction ofEmotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 51 (1988).
226. See Gergen, supra note 179.
227. See Chamallas, supra note 32, at 2180-82.
228. See id. at 2183-87.
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filling gaps in employment law. 22 9 Specifically, broader interpretations
of IIED and invasion of privacy could provide remedies for workplace
bullying and workplace intrusions on privacy, respectively. 230 That
theme is perpetuated in arguing that IIED should be applied to permit
recovery for wrongful discharge in some cases of termination that do
not fit comfortably within employment discrimination theories, such as
the sex- and appearance-tinged terminations discussed above. This
modest expansion of IIED is the appropriate response to a significant
gap in the law-termination cases that do not fit squarely within
employment discrimination law but where society rankles at leaving
the plaintiff without a legal remedy.
This argument is built on the idea that the two great pillars of
employment law in the United States are employment at will and
employment discrimination laws. 2 3 ' Between them there are cases for
which the law should provide a remedy. There are three possible ways
to address this problem and permit recovery: (1) abrogating
employment at will; (2) expanding employment discrimination law; or
(3) filling the gap with something, thus effectively contracting
employment at will. As for abrogating employment at will, despite
numerous proposals over the years, 2 32 only one state has passed
legislation to modify employment at will,2 3 3 and no others are likely to
do so in the foreseeable future.
Regarding expanding or stretching employment discrimination
law to cover the cases, there are a number of reasons for rejecting that
solution. First, many courts simply are unwilling to stretch
discrimination law to cover such cases. Consider, for example, Nelson,
in which the court held that terminating an employee because her
employer found her irresistible was not sex discrimination. 234 Like
other courts, the Iowa Supreme Court implicitly followed the tenet that
the employment discrimination laws modify employment at will only
slightly.2 35 Although one may argue that the Nelson case was decided

229. See William R. Corbett, The Needfor a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 91, 153-54 (2003).
230. See id. at 153-56.
231. See supra Part I.
232. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (discussing unsuccessful proposals).
233. See supra note 10 (discussing the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment
Act).
234. See supra Part II.A.
235. See, e.g., Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1233 n.20 (3d Cir. 1994)
cert. granted and judgment vacated in part, 514 U.S. 1034 (1995) (stating that "the
employment-at-will doctrine has been abridged only to the extent necessary to enforce the
federal employment discrimination laws").
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wrongly and that Ms. Nelson and other plaintiffs in similar cases
should be afforded a remedy under the employment discrimination
laws, there are reasons to look to tort law instead. The most significant
reason is that plaintiffs rarely prevail under the employment
discrimination laws now, 236 so simply bringing more termination cases
under them would not change employees' chances. Employment
discrimination law has become rigid,237 not amenable to reaching cases
that do not fit the formal proof structures or the requirement of a
discriminatory motive.238 Consequently, it is difficult for courts to
stretch the analysis to cover peripheral cases. Moreover, stretching
employment discrimination law to cover wrongful discharge cases at
the periphery of discrimination could weaken the laws in their core
objectives of deterring and eradicating invidious discrimination; they
should not come to be viewed as backdoor wrongful termination
claims.
Rejecting abrogation of employment at will and expansion of
employment discrimination law, I propose fashioning a new concept of
IIED so that it fills the gap and effectively contracts employment at will
slightly. Although IIED as it is currently understood does not provide a
reliable theory of recovery in abusive termination cases, 23 9 the seeds of
reform have been planted. 240 I call for IIED to be strengthened so that it
can serve as an effective gap filler in employment law. Drawing on
Professor Chamallas's arguments, I contend that principles of
employment discrimination law, specifically hostile environment
sexual harassment theory, have migrated to and informed IIED, 24 ' as
indicated in part by the successful claims for IIED involving sexual
harassment allegations.2 42 Although courts do not necessarily equate
the severe or pervasive requirement of hostile environment with
outrage, there has been movement in that direction.
Both IIED specifically and tort law generally are well suited to
addressing appearance- and sex-based terminations. IIED's outrage
element is amorphous and thus adaptable. Applying it to terminations
is reasonable in light of the importance most people attach to their
236. See supra note 16.
237. See, e.g., Chamallas,supra note 32, at 2177.
238. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
239. See supra Part III.A.
240. See supra Part IV.A.
241. Chamallas, supra note 32, at 2172 (positing that tort law can borrow from hostile
environment law to give meaning to outrageous conduct); Duffy, supra note 179, at 420
(noting that, as applied in the employment context, IIED is "analogous to hostile
environment sexual harassment claims").
242. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
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jobs, often defining themselves in significant part by their jobs.
Furthermore, the tort of outrage has been steeped in issues of gender,
sexuality, and morality since its inception.2 43 Women, who seem
disproportionately to be the victims of these appearance- and sexbased terminations, have been favored under IIED,244 with Prosser
remarking early in the life of the tort that "'[n]early all of the plaintiffs
have been women ....

"1245

Tort law, with many of its flexible doctrines, also may provide a
more calibrated incursion into employment at will than the rigid
structures of employment discrimination law. Consider, for example,
the court's discussion in the original opinion in the Nelson case of the
plaintiff being without fault in encouraging the overtures of her
employer: "whether an employee who has not engaged in flirtatious
conduct may be lawfully terminated simply because the boss views her
as an irresistible attraction."2 46 The court noted the difference between
that situation and the facts presented in Tenge v. PhillipsModern Ag Co.,
in which the plaintiff was fired because of her admitted flirtatious
conduct with her employer. In the substitute opinion, the special
concurrence stressed that Nelson was fired because of her consensual
participation in a close personal relationship with Knight. 247 However,
the Iowa court noted that in employment discrimination law such a
distinction usually is meaningless because the focus is on the
discriminatory and unlawful motivation of the employer rather than
on the fairness of the decision in the broader sense.248 While
employment discrimination law is not well-suited to address such
issues, tort law is.
Beyond simply deciding whether the conduct is actionable or not,
tort law has comparative fault principles that may be applied so that
fault can be allocated to both employer and employee in appropriate
cases. 2 4 9 in cases of termination, it is often plausible that there is more
243. See Chamallas, supra note 32, at 2121.
244. Id at2152.
245. Id. 2152-53 (quoting William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A
New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 888 (1939)).
246. Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., No. 11-857, 2012 WL 6652747, at *5 (Iowa Dec.
21, 2012).
247. Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 80 (Iowa 2013) (Cady, C.J.,
concurring specially).
248. Id. at 69.
249. This is a broad generalization about comparative fault. The specifics of comparative
fault depend on the particular state's law. A few states adhere to contributory negligence
rather than comparative fault. Furthermore, it must be determined whether a particular
state's tort law permits application of comparative fault in the context of intentional torts
and between intentional torts and negligence. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
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than one cause of the employee's discharge, and the employee may be
partly at fault. While one of the major issues of employment
discrimination law has been wrestling with various standards of
causation borrowed from tort law, 250 employment discrimination law
has not benefited from a tort tool like comparative fault, which can
relieve the all-or-nothing issue.
What adjustments of IIED would be needed for it to perform this
gap filling role? In short, courts must be more receptive to the
argument that firing employees under some circumstances is
outrageous. In addition, those outrageous circumstances should not be
limited to the manner of firing-i.e., "discharge with dignity,"-but
should also extend to some bad reasons for termination. For example,
certain bad reasons for termination 251 that previously were immunized
under employment at will would be considered bad enough to satisfy
outrageous conduct. This liberalization of IIED could be effected in part
by a substantive change: courts articulating that the standard for
outrageous conduct can include employers terminating employees for
some bad reasons, such as reasons related to appearance and sex. It
also could be facilitated by procedural changes. First, courts routinely
grant summary judgment in employment cases, dismissing plaintiffs'
IIED claims by concluding as a matter of law that the conduct is not
outrageous. 25 2 If courts would deny summary judgment in some
abusive discharge cases and leave the case to juries, then the doctrine
may gain traction, as juries tend to favor plaintiffs in IIED claims 253 and
termination cases. Second, appellate courts often reverse IIED
judgments based on jury verdicts. 25 4 Under the approach I describe,
appellate courts should be less inclined to reverse such judgments.
One objection often posed to application of IIED in the context of
employment is that employers fear the uncertainty and
unpredictability of what conduct may be found to be outrageous. 255
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 cmt. b (2012) (surveying the approaches). While most
jurisdictions do not compare the fault of an intentional tortfeasor defendant and a plaintiff,
id., it might be an appropriate adaptation of tort principles in the context of employment
discrimination law.
250. See, e.g., University of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522-23
(2013); Gross v. FBL Fin. Srvs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190-91 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
251. Consider, for example, some of the bad reasons for termination in the cases
discussed in this article: attractiveness, unattractiveness, domestic abuse, and refusal to
have an abortion.
252. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 179, at 1694-95.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 179, at 410 (arguing that "an employer would be left in a
quandary as to the circumstances under which a demotion or other change in the terms or
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Thus, expanded application of IIED to termination cases could act as a
substantial retrenchment on employment at will. However, the
expansion that I advocate is for cases that are on the periphery of
discrimination and harassment law, such as the cases discussed earlier
in which appearance or sex is at least a factor in the termination. Under
current law, plaintiffs often sue for sex or other discrimination in these
cases, and courts struggle to determine whether the claims come
within the principles of discrimination law. Employers should not have
difficulty identifying the type of conduct that could result in liability
under IIED, as such conduct now often prompts discrimination

lawsuits. 256
What are the advantages of this proposal for expanding the scope
of IIED? Would Nelson or any of the other women fired for reasons of
sex or appearance win their cases? With a malleable tort standard like
outrage, I do not wish to propose an answer for any specific case. I only
wish to persuade that some terminations that do not fit neatly under
employment discrimination law are likely to be considered outrageous
by society. Instead, under this approach, fact finders would decide
more of these cases at trial. I suspect that under this liberalized
standard, more cases would settle. Furthermore, instead of fretting
over whether employment discrimination law covers such a case, we
can turn to a tort theory that permits society to express outrage at
employment terminations, even in a body of law dominated by
employment at will.
CONCLUSION

The firing of Melissa Nelson because her employer found her
irresistible triggered a sense of moral outrage. It was an unfair firing
for reasons of sex and appearance. Applied to a real person, "You're
fired!" was not so entertaining. That case and many other terminations
involving aspects of appearance or sex lie on the border of
employment discrimination law, and fired female workers suing for
sex and other types of discrimination often lose. Such cases are not
uncommon in the land of employment at will. The reaction of society is
appropriate-we should be outraged that workers can be fired for
such reasons and the legal system currently provides no remedy. The
conditions of at will employment would subject it to damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress"); Gergen, supra note 179, at 1695.
256. See, e.g., Lynn, Jackson, Shultz, Lebrun, P.C., Firedfor Being Too Tempting, S.D. EMP.
L. LETTER, Feb. 2013 (stating that "Knight found himself standing too close to the line"
because he would not stop his questionable conduct, and stating "[w]e don't recommend
Knight's actions as a model for yours").
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appropriate answer, however, is not to expand employment
discrimination law, which is overtaxed with termination claims already
and has a low success rate for plaintiffs. Society's outrage should be
assuaged by an expanded conception of the tort of outrage, a theory of
recovery that has underperformed to date, but that has remarkable
potential to address such cases. Employment law needs a good tort for
wrongful discharge, and IIED could rise to the occasion.

